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In the face of growing management problems and conflicts over increasing demands and 
dwindling or increasingly variable supplies of surface and groundwater, the need for revising the 
conventional water resource allocation methods has been increasingly felt among natural 
resource managers and policy makers. For the past 30 years economists have advocated for the 
application of various types of market-based instruments (MBIs) as an efficient means of 
effecting the re-allocation water resources among competing uses. While MBIs have been 
implemented in several countries, they have continued to encounter strong socio-political 
opposition, due to the impacts imposed on third-parties during transfers and re-allocations, as 
well as the distributional effects across different types of water users.  
Despite the demonstrable efficiency gains of MBIs, the resulting equity or distributional 
effects of MBI-driven re-allocations can be of equal or greater importance to policy-makers and 
the constituents that they serve. At the same time, the realized gains in economic efficiency from 
the application of MBIs depend heavily on the heterogeneity of the agents they are targeted 
towards, as well as the degree of information asymmetry that the regulator faces. 
In this paper, we use a simple theoretical framework to show the trade-offs between 
efficiency and equity that might arise from the application of MBIs to a heterogenous population 
of agents drawing non-cooperatively from a natural resource pool. Using the idealized 
centralized planner as a benchmark of dynamic, allocative efficiency, we compare the realized 
efficiency gains that can be realized by alternative policy instruments and the resulting impacts 
on distributional equity, in terms of the cumulative net benefits over time. Using the specific 
example of groundwater and the empirical setting of Southern California, we are able to 
highlight the trade-offs between efficiency and equity that might exist among alternative policy 
instruments, and how MBIs perform with respect to those dual criteria. We find that under agent 
heterogeneity, there are asymmetric gains in efficiency when the centralized planner allocations 
are constrained by equity considerations. Through such results, this paper demonstrates the 
importance of considering both efficiency gains and the minimization of disparities in 
distributional inequity, when designing policy instruments that create winners and losers with 




1.  Overview 
 
1.1    Introduction 
 
Policy makers and researchers have faced the challenge of addressing pressing issues of 
environmental and natural resource management and regulation with policy instruments that are 
both effective, in terms of achieving the desired outcomes, while striving to improve the 
economic efficiency, as defined in terms of the resulting change in net benefits of the economic 
agents involved. The consideration of such problems ranges, in the literature, from that of 
pollution of air and water, to that of the management of water, soil and other natural resources. 
Among the challenges that are faced by environmental managers and policy makers are that of 
coordinating the behavior of individual economic agents whose actions have direct impacts on 
the environment and the state of important natural resources, which lie under their stewardship. 
While direct centralized control and intervention might be called for, resource and personnel 
limitations necessitate the application of decentralized policy instruments, which are designed 
with a view to maximizing overall benefits, and achieving the best possible environmental 
outcomes. Nonetheless, some form centralized regulation is often considered due to the difficulty 
of realizing de-centralized Coasian bargaining, either due to the presence of transactions costs, 
asymmetry in information (Farrell, 1987), scale considerations (Nalebuff, 1997) or other reasons.  
One of the primary obstacles that lie in the way of achieving both the desired 
environmental and economic goals is that of agent heterogeneity, which complicates the design 
of the appropriate policy instrument that the regulator wishes to apply. In the case of 
homogeneity, a simple, decentralized policy instrument can be applied to bring the actions of the 
agents in line with that of the idealized central planner, whose actions form the benchmark for 
economic efficiency. As the characteristics of the multiple agents diverge from that of uniform 
homogeneity, the amount of information the regulator requires to design the appropriate set of 
efficiency-enhancing policy instruments, increases.   
Market-based instruments (MBIs) have slowly gained popularity among those 
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there are multiple agents, whose heterogeneity might other reduce the efficiency of a non-
discriminatory policy instrument. The classical application of market-based policy instruments of 
environmental regulation, has been that of pollution control, in which the costs of abatement 
might vary across the polluters (Baumol and Oates, 1975). The seminal works of McGartland 
and Oates (1985) and Tietenberg (1985) were the first to discuss a decentralized system of 
tradable permits that could be bought and sold within a transparent market structure that could be 
used to improve the environment. The application of market-based instruments can also be found 
within the context of natural resource management, such as in the application of tradeable quotas 
in fishery management (Anderson, 1995; Hanley et al., 1997). The success of the system of 
tradable emissions permits  to address the acid-rain problem in North America has been noted 
widely, and is a recognized example of the successful application of economic theory to 
institutional and market design (Tietenberg, 1985; Joskow et al., 1998).   
While achievement of environmentally-sound outcomes is important, policy makers must 
also take into account considerations of equity, which can sometimes have stronger socio-
political ramifications than the simple achievement of welfare-neutral gains in overall economic 
efficiency. The typical, stylized analytical models that are used in the quantitative investigation 
of efficiency gains under alternative policies, tend to impose the assumption of agent 
homogeneity, for the purposes of simplicity and analytical convenience. While necessary, for 
complex types of problems, the assumption of homogeneity, nonetheless, overlooks important 
questions of equity, and what implications that alternative policy regimes might have on the 
distribution of benefits across different agents. While some authors have investigated efficiency 
and equity considerations within the context of water management, these have mostly centered 
around the issue of surface water pricing (Tsur and Dinar, 1995), but have not directly addressed 
the context of groundwater usage – which has strong implications for resource dynamics over 
time, and long-run sustainability.       
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on groundwater management policy by 
examining the tradeoffs between efficiency and equity, when applying market-based policy 
instruments aimed at reducing the negative externalities imposed by non-cooperative 
groundwater pumping.  Using a stylized model within a specific empirical context, we examine 
how the distribution of potential gains to groundwater management changes under the Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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application of alternative policy instruments, in the presence of agent heterogeneity.  Through 
this exercise, we gain useful insights into how policy makers and environmental managers might 
address issues of equity and efficiency when considering policy intervention in other 
groundwater basins, as well as in other common-pool problems, more generally. We also 
demonstrate the importance of addressing agent heterogeneity when trying to address the issues 
of equity and efficiency in policy design, especially in a dynamic context.  
 
  The rest of this paper is designed as follows.  Following a brief description of the policy 
problem, we describe the simple analytical framework that will be used to assess the tradeoffs 
between economic efficiency and equity, later in the paper.  This section is followed by a brief 
description of the empirical hydrological model that is used for the policy analysis in this paper, 
and the type of market-based policy instruments that will be applied to the investigation of 
changes in economic efficiency and equity. Following the simulation of the model, under 
alternative instruments, we summarize the results and compare the changes in efficiency and 
distributional consequences for the heterogeneous.  These results and other summary comments 
and policy recommendations are included in the closing section of the paper.  
 
2.  Groundwater Management Policy and Problems  
 
Common Property regimes are well-studied in the economic literature, due to the 
externalities that are typically imposed on users of the resource and the difficulty of regulation 
and enforcement (Hardin, 1968; Gordon, 1954).  These externalities arise from over-exploitation 
of the common-pool resource by users, who typically have unrestricted access to it, and consider 
only their own private benefits when deciding how much of the resource to exploit (Scott, 1954; 
Dasgupta and Heal, 1979).  Regulation is often required due to the difficulty of realizing 
decentralized Coasian bargaining, either due to the presence of transactions costs, asymmetry in 
information (Farrell, 1987), scale considerations (Nalebuff, 1997) or other reasons.  
Groundwater is a frequently over-exploited common-pool resource for irrigated 
agriculture, and its depletion, in numerous cases that have been studied, has led to serious 
conflicts between users (Ostrom, 1990).  Gisser and Sanchez (1980) were among the first to 
examine the externalities arising from the extraction of groundwater as a common-property Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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problem.  In this article, the authors examined the loss of efficiency that occurs when a 
groundwater aquifer moves from a sole-owner extraction regime to one in which there is 
competition in pumping.  Various other authors within the natural resources literature have also 
addressed the efficiency problems that arise under competitive in groundwater pumping (Allen 
and Gisser, 1984; Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; Kim et al., 1989), both theoretically and 
empirically. 
 In periods of severe water scarcity, such as that which faced California during the 
drought in the early 1990s, novel mechanisms for re-allocation have been applied – but have 
inevitably led to conflicts and disputes, often highlighted by those who able to mobilize political 
support, and who perceived undue harm was done to them in the re-allocation process. Some of 
these conflicts arose from disputed third-party impacts attributed to policy-promoted water 
transfers, such as those made to the California Emergency Drought Water Bank (Hanak, 2003) or 
from other voluntary market transactions (Murphy et al., 2003).  While the State Water Bank 
was initiated with the understanding that third-party interests would be observed and adequately 
protected (Thilmany and Gardner, 1992), the majority of the impacts resulting from the water 
transfers to the Drought Bank were borne by the groundwater basin, causing third-party impacts 
on the local economies (resulting from sale of surface water rights) to be substituted for third-
party impacts on groundwater users (Howitt, 1993a,b). As an illustration of this effect, nearly 
37% of the increased depletion of groundwater in the Lower Cache Unit of Yolo County was 
attributable to transfers made to the Water Bank in 1991 (McBean, 1993).  
  From these examples, one sees that the dual criteria of both efficiency-enhancement and 
equity-preservation exist in tandem within the minds of policy makers and resource managers 
who are accountable to the concerns of the voting public. In this paper, we examine more closely 
how these criteria can be evaluated and compared, when addressing the design of market-based 
instruments of re-allocation applied to the context of groundwater.    
 
3. Assessing Efficiency and Equity of Policy Interventions 
 
In this section we describe the particular analytical framework that we use to assess the 
trade-off between economic efficiency and distributional equity, when applying alternative 
policy instruments to the management of groundwater resources. Most papers that have looked at Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
IAAE, 2006 
 7 
issues of efficiency and equity in water policy have been grounded in a static framework of 
analysis which, while capturing the essential trade-offs, tends to overlook the true nature of the 
benefits that accrue to natural resource stocks such as groundwater, which endure over time and 
whose social value is measured in terms of a stream of benefits that accrue over a given horizon. 
The analytical framework that we use in this paper, to examine the trade-offs between the 
efficiency of water allocations and the implications for equity in the distribution of benefits is a 
dynamic one, which explicitly takes into account the dynamic nature of the externalities that 
arise when socially-optimal, inter-temporal behavior is replaced by non-cooperative and myopic 
behavior of heterogeneous agents.  
 
3.1 Defining the Benchmark of Efficiency  
 
 The problem facing the social planner who takes the inter-temporal welfare of all agents 
into account, when making allocations of the natural resource over time forms the benchmark for 
efficiency that economists consider, when comparing the performance of decentralized policy 
instruments and regimens. Considering the case of iplayers, who differ according to the 
marginal benefits that they enjoy in the exploitation of the resource. Denoting the marginal 
benefit curve as ( ) ii MBw a bq =−⋅, where aand b are, respectively, the intercept and slope of 
the agent’s demand curve for water withdrawals  i q . For iheterogeneous agents, we could 
consider a distribution of slope parameters, such that we have values ranked as 
1 iN bb b << < KK  along an interval of length   1 N bb − . Taking into account the costs of 
groundwater pumping, which depend on the depth of the groundwater table below the surface 
() sh −







ii i i i i
ii
B qa q b q e s h q
==
⎡ ⎤ = ⋅− ⋅ − −⋅ ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑  (3.1.1) 
where eis the common energy cost of pumping that is faced by all agents pumping from depth of  
() sh − . According to the principle of optimality laid out by Bellman (1957), and which is 
commonly used in the definition of the inter-temporal benchmark of allocative efficiency in 
                                                 
1 where s and h are, respectively, the heights of the ground surface and groundwater table above a given reference 
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natural resource economics, the central manager (social planner) of the groundwater resource 
water, would make a centralized distribution of groundwater resources over time according to the 










ii i iS P i q
i i
Vh a q b qe s h q Vh q r βγ
= =
⎧⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ =⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ + + − ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭ ∑∑  (3.1.2) 
where, in addition to the aggregate benefits captured in (3.1.1), the planner also takes into 
account the value of groundwater stock that remains in the next period (and by implication, into 
the future). The Bellman equation (3.1.2), shown above, captures the maximized value of the 
current value of total net benefits of all players, as well as that discounted value which will be 
realized from the stock of groundwater which remains (and is treated optimally) in the following 
period
2. The ‘value function’  ()
SP Vh captures this maximized value, and is a mapping of the 
allocations accruing to all agents (an N-dimensional vector) onto the real number line – and 
which is recursively defined for both the current stock of groundwater (captured by h), as well 
as for that which remains in the following period h
+. Given the recursive nature of the value 
function, it must be solved as a fixed-point problem which finds the functional form whose 
maximization implies the relationship between adjacent periods given by (3.1.2). The evolution 
of the state of the groundwater table between one period and the next is governed by the equation 





hh q r γ
+
=
= +− ∑       ( 3 . 1 . 3 )  
which includes the recharge into the aquifer ( ) r  and a parameter ( ) γ  which translates units of 
pumping volume into groundwater table height.  
 
  The social planner’s solution for each agent can be summarized by a policy function, 
which takes into account the current height of the groundwater table, and the marginal net 
benefits accruing to each agent, as it is affected by all the parameters of the problem and the 
planner’s own inter-temporal preferences, such that we have the “rule” shown below  
                                                 
2 where 
SP β is the discount factor considered by the social planner, and which embodies the planner’s inter-
temporal preferences and tradeoff between benefits accrued in the current period, and those which are realized in 
future.  Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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  ( ) ,,,,
SP
ii qf h a b e β γ =  (3.1.4) 
which governs the allocation of groundwater over time, for any value of halong the time 
horizon. This function embodies the trade-off between inter-temporal benefits captured by the 
first-order conditions of the Bellman equation (3.1.2), which yield the following Euler equation 
  ( ) ( ) 0
SP
ii S P q abq e sh V γβ −⋅− − +⋅ =    (3.1.5) 
This ‘policy function’ could be contrasted to the much more simplified extraction ‘rule’ implied 
by an individual agent who pumps myopically and, therefore, ignores the additional benefit that 
would accrue if additional groundwater stock were held over into the next period – which is 
captured by the ‘user cost’ embodied in the term  ( )
SP
SP q V γβ ⋅  of the social planner’s Euler 
equation. The extraction rule of such an agent is simply given by  







=  (3.1.6) 
and which only takes into account the current period’s marginal benefits and costs. The 
divergence in pumping and therefore total net benefits between the solutions given by (3.1.4) and 
(3.1.6) represent the ‘gain’ that can be realized under centralized (and socially-optimal) 
management of the aquifer, using equation (3.1.1), they are 






Gain B q B q
=
=− ∑  (3.1.7) 
and forms the basis by which water economists measure the efficiency gains to centralized 
control.  
The efficiency gains of alternative decentralized policy instruments can be measured 
relative to this benchmark, and thereby used to rank the efficacy of those policy regimes. In this 
paper, we use such a criterion to compare alternative policy instruments, but also compare the 
implications for distributional equity, that is measured in the manner described in the next sub-
section.  
 
3.2 Defining Distributional Equity 
 
Given the definition of inter-temporal allocative efficiency given in the previous sub-
section, we can now define the measure of distributional equity that will be used in this paper to Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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compare the various market-based policy instruments that will be examined. This comparison 
will reveal not only the degree to which these instruments can capture the efficiency gains that 
the social planner could realize through centralized management of the aquifer, but also the 
degree to which these alternative instruments change the distribution of benefits among the 
heterogenous agents. Similar to the way in which we consider the net benefits that accrue to the 
agents over time, we also define the distributional benefits in terms of the long-run sum of 
discounted net benefits that accrue across the distribution of agent-types over the extraction 
horizon. By doing so, we obtain a consistent basis from which to compare inter-temporal 
outcomes of equity and efficiency gains.  
A simple and convenient measure of inequality, was defined by Theil (1987) in his 
seminal treatise of economic applications of information theory. A simple index which he 
constructed is that based upon the principle of ‘entropy’, which conveys the degree to which a 
distribution differs from a uniform and un-informative profile  -- thereby capturing the “surprise” 
that is embodied in a (random) outcome (Shannon, 1948a, 1948b). In juxtaposition to Shannon’s 
entropy measure  log( ) nn
n
Hp p =− ∑ for ndiscrete, random events, we can also express the 









⎝⎠ ∑ , which includes the prior 
distribution of weights (or probabilities) { } n p that can be assigned for each random outcome. As 
shown by Kullback (1959), the maximization of the Shannon criterion with respect to the adding 
up constraint  1 n
n
p = ∑  is equivalent to the minimization of the cross-entropy criterion, similarly 
constrained, if the prior distribution is uniform (i.e. assigns an equal likelihood to each outcome). 
The divergence of a calculated distribution from prior beliefs, as calculated by the cross-entropy 
criterion conveys information content in a similar way to that calculated by the Shannon measure 
of information (Kullback and Liebler, 1951).  
The Theil index for inequality has a similar cross-entropy formulation to the Kullback-











⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =⋅ ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ∑  (3.2.1) 
  Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
IAAE, 2006 
 11 
where  i y is the income of the ith individual, and Y is the sum over all N agents. The share of 
aggregated income held by an individual 
i y
Y
is contrasted to the share that would be held if the 
distribution were strictly uniform (i.e. if 
1 i y YN
YYN
= = ). However, rather than seeking the 
minimizing distribution, the Theil index simply uses the implied cross-entropy to convey the 
sense of inequality in existing distribution of incomes among individuals. By this measure, the 
income distribution of a N-membered population can range from 0 (for complete equality) to 
log( ) N , which conveys a maximal level of inequality. 
  For the purposes of our paper, we use this measure to convey the inequality in the 
distribution of net benefits that accrue over time to each heterogeneous agent pumping water 
from the aquifer, in order to assess the impact of the alternative policy instruments on equity, and 
to contrast them to the outcome derived by the social planner’s outcome. Given the present value 








PVB B q β
−
=
=⋅ ∑ , we can calculate the Theil measure of inter-











⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=⋅ ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟








=∑ .  By using this criterion of inequality, we are able to compare equity 
outcomes across various policy instruments and compare them with that of the social planner’s 
outcome.  
 
4. Empirical Specification of Policy Instruments and Model  
  
In the policy analysis that follows, we contrast the non-cooperative behavior of myopically-
extracting agents with the socially-optimal, dynamic equilibrium of the central planner’s 
economic model that was discussed in the previous section. The efficiency gains and equity 
outcomes of alternative decentralized, market-based policy instruments are also assessed and Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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compared to the centralized planner’s outcome, such that we are able to assess the tradeoffs 
between efficiency and equity that are realized under them.  
 
4.1 Empirical Parameterization of the Model 
 
In our discussion we use the specific empirical context of groundwater extraction in Kern 
County, in Southern California, but can extrapolate the findings of our experiments more 
generally. While the economic characteristics of ground and surface water usage in Kern County, 
California have been examined by several authors (Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; Feinerman, 
1988; Dixon, 1991; Knapp and Olson, 1995; Knapp et al., 2003), none of these studies have ever 
considered the trade-off between efficiency and equity in the application of alternative market-
based policy instruments. Feinerman (1988) did examine equity issues in the imposition of pump 
taxes and quotas, but did not extend his analysis to consider market-based trading of quotas, or 
the type of equity analysis that we will consider in this paper.    
  Following Feinerman and Knapp (1983), the simplified hydrology of this example 
includes the net recharge into the aquifer (r ) inside an equation of motion with condensed 
notation for γ and  r , representing the translation of volumetric aquifer recharge and net 
groundwater withdrawal, into units of lift, according to the following definitions 






==  (4.1.1)   
In these expressions, θ  represents the deep percolation into the aquifer, while A represents the 
areal extent of the aquifer, and sis its specific yield. Recharge is given in terms of total inflow 
into the aquifer,I , a base annual level of recharge  ˆ r , and a calibrating parameter ξ .  These 
parameters γ  and r are both used in the equation of motion (3.1.3), which govern the evolution 
of the state of the groundwater resource over time.  
In order to empirically solve and simulate the behavior of the infinite-horizon carry-over 
value function for groundwater stock  ( )
SP Vh
+  given by (3.1.2) for the social planner’s problem, 
we employ standard numerical procedures for solving dynamic programming problems, as 
described by Judd (1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2002). By doing so, we are able to 
implement a robust, numerical polynomial approximation to the infinite-horizon carry-over value Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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function, necessary for solving the social planner’s problem, and which takes on the form, shown 
below,  






Vh V h a h ψφ ψ
++ +
=
≈= ∑ %  (4.1.2) 
where  k a is the coefficient which is fitted by an iterative numerical fixed-point algorithm, which 
must be evaluated at the node points indexed by k. This coefficient is multiplied with the 
corresponding basis function  () k φ ψ , which represents the orthogonal terms of the Chebychev 
polynomial that is employed for the function approximation. The basis functions are defined over 
a domain ψ , which is restricted to the interval [-1,+1], and onto which the state variables, 
h
+must be mapped.  
  On the basis of these parameter definitions, we can now proceed to carry out the analysis 
of alternative market-based instruments for re-allocation. The essential hydrological parameters 
used to characterize groundwater usage in Kern County are summarized in Table 1. 
  
4.2 Groundwater Policy Instruments 
 
The de-centralized policy instruments used to capture the efficiency gains realized under 
central management controls will be of two types – market-based and non-market based. The 
market-based instrument that will be considered will be that of a tradable quota on groundwater 
pumping, that are imposed on each of the agents. The non-market counterpart to this is a fixed 
limit on pumping, that is imposed by a central regulator, and which ignores the heterogeneity of 
the agents and assign a limit based on the “average”-type across all individuals. This is a fairly 
representative type of mechanism, as informational asymmetries typically prevent regulators 
from imposing highly differentiated instruments on a heterogeneous population of economic 
agents. The fixed limit is assigned according to the average pumping solution of the social 
















where  , ˆ
SP
it q  is the optimal, inter-temporal solution of the social planner.  Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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The performance of each of these instruments is contrasted with the imposition of a tax 
(which is non-market based and whose revenue is re-distributed in lump-sum), and that of no 
intervention at all. The tax is calculated on the basis of the social planner’s optimization 
problem, and takes on the average value, over time of the socially-optimal “user cost” given by 
the term  ()
SP
SP q V γβ ⋅  , which is embedded in the Euler condition (3.1.5) of the dynamically-
optimal solution. This term represents the divergence between the marginal cost imputed to 
groundwater pumping by the social planner and that imputed by the optimality criterion of the 
agent who extracts myopically, which is simply 
  
  ( ) 0 ii abq e sh − ⋅− − = (4.2.2) 
and which leads to the simple, myopic extraction rule given, earlier, by (3.1.6). By equating the 
average value of this ‘user cost’, over the social planner’s extraction horizon, to an optimal per-








=⋅ ∑   , we can re-cast the myopic extraction 
problem as  




ii i i i i qa q b q e s h q t x q =⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅  (4.2.3) 
 
and would expect the behavior of the individual agent to conform closely to that of the social 
planner.  
 
The efficiency gains of both the market and non-market instruments are compared with 
that of the socially-optimal solution imposed by the centralized groundwater manager, and also 
compared in terms of the equity outcomes. Given that the idealized social planner faces no 
informational asymmetries and knows all the ‘types’ of the individual agents, we expect that the 
divergences in outcomes also incorporate the effect of information-deficit that is faced by the 
regulator when imposing de-centralized policy instruments. The market-based instrument, 
however, is better able to handle this deficit, as it relies on the interactions between individual 
agents, who each have knowledge of their own preferences and who can act accordingly. The 
specification of this market interaction between agents, is described in the next sub-section.        
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4.3 Tradable Quotas in Groundwater Allocations 
  
  In order to characterize the market-based re-allocation that we consider in this paper, we 
describe a regime in which the (otherwise) fixed allocations on groundwater pumping assigned 
to each heterogenous agent can be traded between individuals. Starting from the basic idea of 
assigning a maximum quantity – or a quota – of allowable pumping to each economically-
behaving (and extracting) agent in an economy, we conjecture that each agent has a preference to 
receiving greater amounts of quota. This assumes, of course, that more pumping is correlated 
(positively) with a higher level of economically productive activity – which creates the 
willingness for an agent to pay for an additional amount of quota, on the margin. This marginal 
value of quota (denoted  () Q λ ) depends on the amount of quota being held () Q  – and is 
conjectured to decrease with increasing allocations of quota. This declining relationship between 
willingness to pay and the amount of quota held is, essentially, a demand relationship for an 
individual agent with a given allocation of allowable pumping( ) Q , and the slope of this demand 








This demand relationship is as a downward-sloping curve, whose integral represents the total 
benefit that the agent would derive from an allocation of quota  1 Q , denoted by the area 
underneath the curve, () 1 B Q , as shown in Figure 1.  
  Having now defined the demand for quota for a single agent, we can now extend our 
discussion to consider the problem facing two agents, so as to motivate a de-centralized system 
of tradable quota allocations.  If each agent is assigned rights to a portion of the total allowable 
limit on pumping, as individual quota  12 qqQ + = , we would have the situation depicted in 
Figure 2, where the length of the horizontal axis underlying the demand curves of both agents 
represent the total limit on pumping. From Figure 2, we see that the initial allocations of quota 
() 12 , qq is such that the marginal value that agent 2 is willing to pay for an extra unit of quota 
allocation, is greater than that which agent 1 is willing to pay for an extra unit. The resulting Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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differential in marginal values, therefore, indicates that there are gains to re-allocation of quota 
between the two agents. The point at which the marginal values are equated, as a result of the de-
centralized transfer of z units of quota from agent 1 to agent 2, is indicated in Figure 2 as 
() ()
**
11 22 qz qz λλ −= +, and corresponds to the first-order, necessary conditions of the ‘social’ 
optimization problem, in which the combined surplus under the demand curves of both agents is 
jointly maximized by the central planner who can make a frictionless transfer or rights with full 
information on both agents, as shown below 
    () ()
12
1




zq qd q qd q λλ
−+
≤ + ∫∫  (4.3.2)   
The de-centralized re-allocation of quota described above, however, corresponds to the 
case where there are no transactions costs facing the two agents, and is a highly idealized 
environment in which to study a tradable permit scheme.  The more realistic situation is one in 
which there is a per-unit transaction cost for every unit of quota that is transferred from one 
agent to another, which can be denoted byτ .  This transaction cost can be conceptualized as the 
cost that must be incurred in administratively re-assigning the rights embodied in each unit of 
quota from one agent to another, such that the central authority recognizes the re-allocation as a 
legitimate re-assignment of permissible pumping – such as by undergoing some administrative or 
legal procedure that approves and documents the transfer between farmers
3.    
  The more realistic case of non-zero transaction costs gives rise to the re-allocation of the 
initial endowment of quota that corresponds to the equilibrium depicted in Figure 3. In this 
situation, the equilibrium re-allocation of initial quota endowment between agents corresponds to 
the condition  () () 22 11 ˆˆ qz qz λ λτ += −+ , which drives the optimized re-allocation  ˆ z  to fall short 
of that which would result from a cost-free transfer ( )
* z , as indicated in Figure 2. The “wedge” 
created by the per-unit transaction cost of transfer would widen if the cost τ were to increase 
further.  
  It is for this reason, that the reduction of transactions costs in policy implementation 
remains the matter of greatest importance and concern to policy researchers involved in the 
                                                 
3 The reader can most readily identify with this procedure through the example of selling an automobile. Not only is 
there a cost in identifying a suitable, trustworthy, and willing buyer through costly advertising and screening of 
numerous inquiries, but there is also the necessary paperwork that must be done with the vehicle licensing authority, 
such that the transfer is recognized as being a legitimate re-allocation of property.   Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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design of market-based institutional mechanisms to regulate and manage environmental quality. 
Since it is the transactions cost which cause ‘decentralized’, market-based allocation mechanisms 
to deviate from the ideal of efficiency – as epitomized in the allegorical problem facing the social 
planner – the reduction of such costs is foremost amongst the goals of the policy maker. Since 
most individual agents (or policy makers) cannot make decisions with the same level of 
information that the idealized central planner has, such mechanisms will always fall short – but 
those which are better designed will deviate less from the ideal outcome.  
  By using the inverse demand relationships for each farmer type ( ) ,1 , 2 ii pab qi =− = , 
we integrate under them to obtain the total benefit that each farmer receives for a given 
allocation of quotaq, as  
2 1
2 () ii i B qa qb q =−  and can use this to specify the following 
equilibrium model. Following Takayama and Judge’s (1964) formulation for a spatial 
equilibrium model, the surplus maximizing, de-centralized re-allocation of quota can be obtained 


























where the initial allocations for the type 1 and 2 farmers is given as  1,2 i q =  and the outgoing 
transfers from farmer 1 () 1 z or farmer 2 ( ) 2 z incur a per unit transaction cost of  1,2 i τ = .  The 
solution to this problem can then be compared to that from an egalitarian re-distribution, which 









⎡⎤ ⋅− ⎣⎦ ∑ , where  12 ˆˆ qq = .  
  The application of this type of spatial equilibrium model has been applied, in the 
literature, to the analysis of trade-based re-allocations of water between heterogenous users, 
beginning with Vaux and Howitt (1984). In this paper, we apply this to the re-allocation of 
pumping quota, in order to characterize the operation of a market-based policy instrument, and 
so that we can contrast the efficiency gains and equity outcomes with other decentralized policy 
instruments. In this paper we also ignore the transactions costs, and proceed on the basis of 




5. Empirical Analysis of Groundwater Policy Instruments 
 
5.1 Evaluating the Efficiency-Equity Frontier 
 
  By turning back to the benchmark efficiency case, embodied in the social planner’s 
solution, described in section 3.1, we can evaluate the possible combinations of economic 
efficiency gains and equity outcomes that are possible in the planner’s socially-optimized 
outcome.  We can do this by introducing a constraint  into the basic formulation of the social 
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⎪⎪ = ⎨⎬





lim T is an imposed limit on inequality, and where  i PVB and  T PVB are cumulative measures 
of the present value of net benefits for each individual ias well as for all agents, as it is measured 
in each time period of the social planner’s horizon.  
 By  ‘parameterizing’  the right hand side value (
lim T ) of the constraint in (5.1.1), we can 
observe how the efficiency gains change with the mandated limit on intra-agent inequality. By so 
doing, we can derive a ‘frontier’ that describes the possible combination of ‘best’ social 
outcomes that are possible under centralized control, when maximum levels of inequality are 
defined for a heterogeneous population of economic agents.  
  The result of this parameterization exercise are shown in Figure 4, which illustrates that 
higher levels of efficiency gains are possible, when the social planner is constrained so as not to 
exceed increasingly lowered levels of intra-agent inequality, as captured by the Theil cross-
entropy measure. This frontier also demonstrates that the unconstrained social planner’s problem 
does not necessarily represent the ‘best’ outcome that is possible, when one considers agent 
heterogeneity. As shown in Table 2, the unconstrained socially-optimal outcome gives both a Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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lower level of efficiency gains and a higher level of inequality, as compared to the constrained 
cases, where the social planner is constrained to adhere to more egalitarian social standards of 
inter-temporal welfare. Table 2 also shows that as the limit on inequality is lowered, there is a 
noticeable shift in the distribution of aggregate present value of net benefits such that the 
allocations at the two “ends” of the spectrum of heterogeneous agents become more equal, as is 
also shown in Figure 5. But in doing this, the percentage of the total gains that are realized under 
centralized management intervention become more “skewed”, as shown in Figure 6, such that 
they begin to accrue more to that “end” of the spectrum that was the most disadvantaged (in 
terms of the share of aggregate net benefits received) in the unconstrained case – i.e. the N
th 
agent. Given that the slope of the demand curve gets steeper for those approaching the N
th agent, 
the management gains (under centralized intervention) get skewed to favor the agents who pump 
a relatively small amount of groundwater, compared to those towards the “front” of the 
spectrum, who perceive a larger marginal benefit for a given quantity of pumping, while still 
allowing the distribution of actual aggregate net benefits to become more even. The 
unconstrained case corresponds to the T_lim = 0.0005 line, where the share of aggregate present 
value net benefits are more un-evenly distributed (in Figure 5), but where the percentage gains to 
centralized management intervention are distributed more evenly across players (Figure 6).  
These results point to the gap that exists in the natural resources management literature, 
which has not treated the issue of agent heterogeneity with respect to the welfare implications 
and outcomes of distributional equity. The classical benchmark of efficiency, as embodied in the 
social planner’s problem, can only ensure the globally ‘best’ social optimum if the case of 
symmetry and homogeneity is considered – as is often done in the literature. If considerations of 
equity are important, then a more nuanced analysis must be done in order to determine the true 
welfare benchmark, if the case of heterogeneous agents is treated – and the assumption of global 
optimality in the simple planner’s problem may be violated. Given that most empirical situations 
violate the assumption of homogeneity, more work on the part of researchers is warranted, in this 
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5.2 Evaluation of Alternative Policy Instruments and Discussion 
 
By implementing the analytical framework described in section 4, we can now analyze 
and compare the realized efficiency gains and equity outcomes that arise from the market- and 
non-market-based policy instruments that are considered, and contrast them to the social 
planner’s outcome, as well as that which myopic agents realized without any centralized or de-
centralized management intervention. The insight that is gained from these experiments are 
discussed within the context of more general resource management policy, in the next sub-
section and the concluding section of the paper. 
The results of our policy analysis, under the alternative scenarios described in the 
previous sub-section, are given in Tables 3 and show a trade-off in efficiency and equity between 
the market- and non-market-based policy instruments. While the tradable pumping quota is able 
to achieve a higher level of efficiency gains and, thus, capture a higher percentage of the 
centralized management benefits, there is a significant increase in inequality over the fixed quota 
instrument. Given that we have not imposed a preference structure that weighs inequality against 
efficiency gains, we cannot assign an ordinal ranking that would necessarily declare one outcome 
‘worse’ or ‘better’ than the other. These results serve, simply, to illustrate that the objective of 
efficiency gain can, indeed, be at odds with equity considerations, when weighing the two 
objectives against each other, within the context of a public policy problem. Policy makers and 
natural resource managers are constantly confronted with these kinds of trade-offs, and must 
weight the political benefits and penalties that accrue to each outcome, when making public 
policy decisions on the management of resources and the imposition of regulation and policy 
instruments. As we have not assigned penalties to greater inequality or rewards to efficiency 
gains, the determination of the “optimal” trade-off within the context of this particular problem, 
remains beyond the scope of our paper, but remains squarely within the realm of consideration 









In this paper, we constructed a theoretical framework in which to analyze the trade-offs 
between efficiency and equity, when considered within the context of groundwater extraction, 
and the market-based policy instruments that might be considered, when trying to impose 
regulation and de-centralized control on the otherwise myopic and mutually-harmful actions of 
heterogenous agents. The benchmark of efficiency that we considered was that of the socially-
optimizing, idealized central planner, who considers the dynamically-optimal carry-over value of 
groundwater, when making allocation decisions for each heterogeneous agent. While this planner 
faces no informational asymmetries, with respect to the preferences of the individual agents, she 
might not necessarily achieve the globally ‘best’ outcome, with respect to both efficiency and 
inequality, unless explicit welfare criteria are considered.  
By examining the performance of alternative policy instruments, we see that there is a 
clear trade-off between efficiency and equity when moving from the market-based to the non-
market-based instruments of regulation. While the market-based outcome shows higher 
efficiency gains than the outcome for non-market instrument, there is a clear increase in 
inequality levels among the agents. This highlights the trade-offs policy-makers often face in 
making politically-sensitive decisions on the adoption of policy measures that may create 
winners and losers in a heterogeneous (and real) world. While the political influence of the 
winning or losing parties often determines, in large part, the policy outcomes, the importance of 
equity in the minds of the public should not be under-estimated or ignored by the policy 
researcher, while designing decentralized regulation schemes.  
While researchers are not subject to the socio-political influences of voting 
constituencies, the closer examination of these types of issues should remain high in the agenda 
of further research, so that better, more widely-acceptable, and less ‘friction’-prone policy 
instruments can be designed for the use of policy makers who are subject to these forces. Not 
only will this serve to push forward the state-of-the-art of this type of policy science, but it will 
also enable policy makers and researchers alike to understand the potential trade-offs and pitfalls 
of otherwise appealing decentralized schemes of policy intervention.   
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Appendix : Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1: Derived Demand for Quota and Gross Benefit for a Single Agent 
 
Figure 2: Equilibrium Re-Allocation of Quota between Two Agents  
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Re-Allocation of Quota between Two Agents  
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Figure 4: Frontier of Efficiency and Equity Derived from Social Planner’s Problem 
 




Figure 5: Distribution of Efficiency Gains under Various Limits of Inequality Msangi and Howitt    Equity Effects of Market-Based Instruments 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Efficiency Gains under Various Limits of Inequality 




Table 1: Hydrological Parameters for Aquifer Model of Kern County 
 
 
Parameter Description  Value 
    
A  Area Overlying aquifer   1.26 (million acres) 
s  Specific Yield of Aquifer  0.1 
θ   Deep percolation coefficient  0.2 
e  Energy cost per unit pumping lift  $0.09 acre-ft/ft 
h1  Initial lift (depth-to-water)  220 ft 
ˆ r   Reference level for aquifer recharge  1410 ft 
ξ   Calibrating parameter for recharge eqn  0.7 
I  Average annual surface water inflow  1.90 (million acre-ft) 
a  Demand curve intercept  $92.7/acre-ft 













Table 2: Gains in Cumulative Net Benefits to Adopting Centralized Management of 
Groundwater  with and without Equity Constraints 
 
  Total % Gain from 
Centralized Management 
% Share of PV Net 
Benefits of  
1
st agent  
 % Share of PV 
Net Benefits of  
 N
th agent 
      
Unconstrained Social Planner Problem 
      
Unconstrained   3.9  5.25  4.77 
      
Constrained Social Planner Problem 
      
0.0003 T ≤    4.0 5.20  4.80 
      
0.0002 T ≤   4.1 5.14  4.82 
      
0.0001 T ≤   4.3 5.08  4.85 
      
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Efficiency Gains and Equity Outcomes of Alternative 
Policy Instruments 
 
 Total  %  Efficiency 
Gain 




% of Centralized 
Management 
Gain Captured 
by Policy   
      
Market Instruments 
      
Tradable Pumping Quota   0.19  4.2  5 
      
Non-Market Instruments 
      
Fixed Pumping Quota   0.15  0.56  4 
      
Pump Tax  3.93  4.2  100 
      
No Intervention  0  4.2  0 
      
 
 
 